



The Notification of Mergers Under the
New EEC Merger Control Regulationt
Since September 21, 1990, all transactions meeting the conditions set by the
recently adopted EEC Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings (Merger Control Regulation)' must be notified to the Commission
of the European Communities 2 and cleared by the Commission before they can
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1. Council Regulation No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 32 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 395) 1 (1989) [hereinafter the Merger Control
Regulation]. A corrigendum to this Council Regulation has been published in 33 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 257) 13 (1990). Note that the term "mergers" is not the term of art used in the European
Community (EC) legal vocabulary, but rather the economic word "concentration." Likewise, the EC
uses the word "undertakings," probably derived from French, as the equivalent of the economic
concepts of "firm" or "company." These terms are used interchangeably in this article.
For more general discussions of the new Merger Control Regulation, see Thieffry, The New EC
Merger Control Regulation, 24 INT'L LAW. 543 (1990); Fine, The EC Merger Regulations: the
Commission's Dilemma, 11 Bus. L. REv. 94 (1990); Canenbly & Weitbrecht, EEC Merger Control
Regulation: a Preliminary Analysis, 18 INT'L Bus. LAW 104 (1990); Ferry & Vig, Mergers and
Acquisitions, New EC Control Regulation has Important Antitrust Ramifications, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 20, 1990, at 31-32; Hawk, The EEC Merger Regulation: The First Step Towards One-Step
Merger Control, 59 ANTrrRusT L.J. 195 (1990); Griffin & Calabrese, Assessing EC Merger Control
Regulation, NAT'L L.J. Oct. 1, 1990, at 15; Pappalardo, Le Rtglement CEE sur le Contrdle des
Concentrations, REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE (1990); Gaillard, Le Contrdle des
Concentrations d'Entreprises dans la Communautd Economique Europ~enne, Gazette du Palais
[G. P.], Feb. 1990, at 21; Thieffry, La Commission et les Restructurations, LE FIGARO ECONOMIQE,
Mar. 1990, at 3-4; Gottling & Nikowitz, EEC Merger Control: Distinguishing Concentrative Joint
Ventures, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 185 (1990).
2. The European Economic Community (EEC) is one of three separate communities which
were established by three separate treaties. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Com-
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be put into effect. Under the Merger Control Regulation, the Commission has the
power to oppose, modify, or approve large-scale mergers, acquisitions, or joint
ventures likely to have an impact on the EC market, both within and beyond the
EC territory. In view of the growing pace of European integration, the simulta-
neous increase in corporate restructurings, and the resulting interventions of the
Commission in the field of mergers, the Merger Control Regulation provides the
Commission with new powers to handle many, but clearly not all, of the merger
and acquisition activity in the Community.
The EC's antitrust policy is at the core of the integration process underway in
Europe. Long before the international business community and public had heard
of the "1992" program 3 and even before the United States had proposed its own
Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification legislation,4 the Commission had been
at work on merger control legislation.5 Economically, the need for such legis-
lation has grown in proportion to the surge of merger activity within the Com-
munity in anticipation of 1992.6 Legally, it has long been apparent that the
previously existing national and EC competition provisions-mainly, articles 85
and 86 of the EEC Treaty-were increasingly inadequate.7 It is, however, only
munity, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter EURATOM]. The EEC Treaty
was principally amended by the Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 29 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No- L
169) 1 (1987) [hereinafter SEA].
The EEC relies for its operation on a number of bodies, such as the Council and the Commission
of the European Communities, which are granted the power to issue legislation of both direct and
indirect effect on Member States. The EEC is designed to create a single European market through
the elimination of physical, fiscal, and technical barriers between Member States. The Commissionis
the Communities' executive, charged with implementing and, in many cases, proposing Community
legislation. EEC Treaty, supra, art. 155. In competition matters, the Commission is charged with
enforcement duties. EEC Treaty, supra, art. 89. The Council is the legislative arm of the Community,
making major decisions on policy and adopting legislation. EEC Treaty, supra, arts. 145-54. Its
rulings are granted "supremacy" treatment by the European Community Member States. Case 6/64
Costa v. E.N.E.L., [1964] E.C.R. 593; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8023 (1964). The Court of
Justice of the European Communities has the duty of interpreting and applying the Treaties and
derived legislation. EEC Treaty, supra, arts. 164-88.
3. That is to say, the combination of the SEA and the White Paper on Completing the Internal
Market. The latter commission document is Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the
Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 Final; see 2 INT'L Q. 97 (1990).
4. Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-Trust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383.
5. See Proposal for a Regulation of the Council on the Control of Concentrations between
Undertakings, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 92) 1 (1973) (as amended at 24 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No.
C 36) 3 (1981); 27 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 51) 8 (1984); 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 324) 5 (1986);
31 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 130) 4 (1988); 33 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 22) 14 (1989)).
6. In 1989 alone, $51.7 billion in European Community mergers and acquisitions were
reported. See Financial Times, Feb. 5, 1990, at 16; see also Cross-border Mergers Rose by 8% in
1989, Study Says, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1990, at A5G, col. 4, which states that cross-border mergers
and acquisitions have risen to $50 billion in 1989 from $31.6 billion the year before.
7. The Commission's original position was that the EEC Treaty's provisions on competition
could not apply to mergers. Article 86, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position, a provision
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after more than sixteen years of deadlock that the Council unanimously adopted
the Merger Control Regulation on December 21, 1989.
Perhaps a reflection of the great anticipation for the implementation of the
Merger Control Regulation is the fact that six transactions were notified within
the first two months following its coming into force. As early as October 4,
1990, Renault and Volvo sent notification of their agreement pursuant to which
each would acquire equity in the other, and both would cooperate in their re-
search and development, as well as manufacturing and purchasing activities. 8 By
April 10, 1990, twenty-five mergers had been notified to the Commission, of
which twenty have been considered compatible with the Common Market. The
appendix to this article provides an overview of the cases dealt with or still
pending on April 10, 1991.9
The Merger Control Regulation expressly empowered the Commission to
adopt implementing provisions concerning the form, content, and other proce-
dural issues dealing with merger notification and its subsequent procedure. 10 The
Commission did just that on July 25, 1990, in a specific Commission Regula-
tion 1 on the Notifications, Time Limits, and Hearings Provided for in the
Merger Control Regulation (Commission Regulation on Notifications). On the
same day, the Commission also published two sets of guidelines, 12 one on
"restrictions ancillary to concentrations" (Ancillary Restrictions Notice)' 3 and
the other on "concentrative and cooperative operations" (Notice on Concentra-
somewhat comparable to § 2 of the Sherman Act, was applied by the Court of Justice only once to
a merger, and the Commission expressed the view that it was ill-adapted to mergers. Article 85, on
the other hand, which prohibits.agreements in restraint of trade quite similarly to § 1 of the Sherman
Act, does contain provisions for prior notification and clearance where an agreement has sufficient
redeeming values. However, the Commission considered that it did not apply to the acquisition of
total or partial ownership of enterprises or the reorganization of enterprises. See generally Thieffry,
The New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 1.
8. Notification prtalable d'une operation de Concentration (Affaire No. IV/M 004-Renault/
Volvo), 33 O.J. Etn. Comm. (No. C 254) 4 (1990).
9. Notification prdalable d'une opdration de Concentration (Affaire No. IV/M/018), 33 O.J.
EuR. Comm. (No. C 268) 8 (1990).
10. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1 art. 23. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189 grants
to the Commission the power to issue Regulations which shall have general application and shall be
binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
11. Commission Regulation No. 2367/90 on the Notifications, Time Limits, and Hearings pro-
vided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations between
Undertakings, 33 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 219) 5 (1990) [hereinafter Commission Regulation on
Notifications]. Attached to this Notice as Annex I is Form CO Relating to the Notification of a
Concentration pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, id. Annex I, at 11 [hereinafter
Form].
12. Note that Notices of the European Commission only provide general guidelines and do not
lay down definitive principles. The Commission and Court of Justice are not bound by such notices,
but it is arguable that the Commission might be estopped from imposing fines on agreements clearly
approved by a notice. See C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION
§ 1-065 (1987).
13. Commission Notice Regarding Restrictions Ancillary to Concentrations, 33 O.J. EuR.
CoMM. (No. C 203) 5 (1990) [hereinafter Notice on Ancillary Restraints].
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tive and Cooperative Operation). 14 The interplay of the Merger Control Regu-
lation with the Commission's recent regulations and notices creates a new pro-
cedure, intended for immediate application with minimal ambiguity.
Ironically, although the new procedure is by no means flawless, it is expected
that larger-scale mergers subject to it will ultimately be processed by the Com-
mission more rapidly than smaller deals or other transactions not within the scope
of the Merger Control Regulation. This is due to a major redeeming feature of
this notification: unlike under the preexisting competition law procedures, the
Merger Control Regulation holds the Commission to a strict timetable, 15 the
application of which is better specified by the Commission Regulation on Noti-
fications. Despite the onerous documentary requirements of the Regulation, the
strict time limits it imposes offer significant benefits to parties whose activities
fall within its scope. The parties required to notify must provide the Commission
with notice within one week from the conclusion of the agreement, announce-
ment of the public bid, or acquisition of a controlling interest. 16 Procedurally, the
Commission's subsequent examination of a concentration is broken into two
steps.
The first step of the process commences on receipt of a notification whereupon
the Commission must "within one month at most"'1 7 decide whether the con-
centration falls within the scope of the Regulation and if so, whether doubts are
raised as to its compatibility with the Common Market. ' 8 In the event that the
Commission does not raise such doubts, it must decide within this period of time
to initiate proceedings, 19 or if not, by way of consequence, declare it compatible
with the Common Market-in other words, clear it. 20 Most of the agreements so
far notified to the Commission have not triggered the second step of the Com-
mission's determination. Indeed, of the twenty-five transactions so far notified,21
the Commission has engaged in full-scale investigations with regard to Alcatel's
14. Commission Notice Regarding the Concentrative and Cooperative Operations under Coun-
cil Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 33 O.J.
EuR. COMM. (No. C 203) 10 (1990) [hereinafter Notice on Concentrative and Cooperative
Operations].
15. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 10. Notifications are generally effective upon
receipt, Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note I1, art. 4(1) and the periods of time
begin running the following day. Id. art. 6. See also id. art. 8 provision regarding the addition of
holidays).
16. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 4(l).
17. Id. art. 10(1). This period begins on the day following receipt of a notification or, if the
information to be supplied with the notification is incomplete, the period begins on the day following
the receipt of the complete information.
18. Id. art. 6(l)(a). Note that art. 10(2) increases the period to six weeks when the Commission
receives a request from a Member State pursuant to art. 9(2).
19. Id. art. 6(l)(b).
20. Id. art. 6(l)(a).
21. See appendix.
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acquisition of Telettra,22 Magneti-Marelli's acquisition of CEAC,23 and Tetra-
pak's acquisition of Alfa Laval. 24 If the Commission initiates proceedings, step
two occurs whereby a decision as to the merger must be rendered no more than
four months from the initiation thereof.25 Where the Commission fails to meet
either of these time limits the concentration shall be deemed to be declared
compatible with the Common Market. 
26
Both the Merger Control Regulation and the Commission Regulation on No-
tifications provide parties to the merger and certain third parties with various
opportunities to present their positions vis-A-vis the merger to the Commission.
As in the case of notifications made pursuant to Regulation No. 17, the imple-
menting provision for the procedures conducted by the Commission under the
preexisting EC provisions on competition, articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty, 27 once the Commission has determined that a notified concentration falls
within the scope of the Merger Control Regulation, it must publish notice of the
notification, indicating the names of the parties, the nature of the concentration,
and the economic sectors involved. 28 The Merger Control Regulation also allows
third parties "showing a sufficient interest or management organs of the under-
takings involved or legally recognized workers representatives" the right to
request an opportunity to present their viewpoints. 29 The Commission Regula-
tion on Notifications specifies that such third parties may be allowed to present
their arguments orally or in writing, following a procedure fashioned by the
Commission on a case-by-case basis and notified to them. 30 During the period in
which the Commission analyzes the compatibility of the concentration, the Com-
mission is also required to grant to "all concerned persons, undertakings and
associations of undertakings," as it must at every stage of the procedure, 31 the
opportunity to make known their views or objections against proposed decisions
(i) extending the stay of the merger pending investigation, (ii) dispensing of the
said stay, (iii) on conditions and charges imposed on the parties to ensure their
compliance with the modifications they made to the proposed merger in order to
22. Agence Europe, No. 5414, Jan. 21, 22, 1991, at 7; see appendix item 10.
23. Agence Europe, No. 5414, Jan. 21, 22, 1991, at 7; see appendix item It.
24. Agence Europe, No. 5455, Mar. 20, 1990, at 15; see appendix item 19.
25. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 10(2), (3).
26. Id. art. 10(6). In the cases where Member States' action is warranted, art. 10(6) makes
available a reservation to art. 9.
27. First Council Regulation of February 6, 1962 Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty,
5 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 13) 24 (1962) [hereinafter Regulation No. 17].
28. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 4(3).
29. Id. art. 18(4).
30. Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, art. 15.
31. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1). Note that an advisory committee
consisting of representatives of Member State authorities chaired by the Commission reviews the
Commission's draft decision and renders an advisory opinion thereupon which the Commission must
consider before rendering its final decision concerning a concentration.
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make it acceptable to the Commission, (iv) rejecting the merger, (v) ordering
that it be undone, (vi) overturning a clearance decision, or (vii) assessing mon-
etary sanctions.
32
The notification in itself, however, will be the first significant step of the
process to retain the parties' attention. That the notification deserves such atten-
tion is manifest, as it will normally be the first formal act in the process, whatever
preliminary informal contacts have been taken with the Commission. It will also
trigger the Commission's involvement and, as mentioned above, mark the com-
mencement of the time periods instituted by the Merger Control Regulation. This
article focuses on some of the Merger Control Regulation's practical aspects that
have been significantly affected by the three sets of documents recently issued by
the Commission. First, this article discusses what type of transactions should be
notified. Both the Notice on Concentrative and Cooperative Operations and the
Ancillary Restrictions Notice provide the Commission's views on the Merger
Control Regulation's provisions in this respect. Second, the article focuses on
how the transaction should be notified, an area significantly affected by the
Commission Regulation on Notifications. Third, the article turns to what sanc-
tions will be implemented.
I. Scope of the Notification Requirement
The Merger Control Regulation applies to all "concentrations" with a "com-
munity dimension.' ' 33 Both these concepts are sufficiently sophisticated to raise
a number of issues.
A. TYPE OF MERGERS TO BE NOTIFIED:
THE CONCEPr OF CONCENTRATIONS
The Merger Control Regulation defines a concentration as situations where:
(a) two or more previously independent undertakings merge, or
(b) one or more persons controlling at least one undertaking, or
(c) one or more undertakings acquire, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by
contract or by any other means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one
or more other undertakings.34
From this definition it is clear that a merger is not only deemed to take place
when two or more corporations merge, but also when direct or indirect corporate
control is acquired through stock or asset purchases, contractual relationships, or
other means. Control is defined quite practically as any means that "confer the
32. Id. art. 18(1). See also Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, arts. 11, 12,
13. The Commission shall make available to the parties the right to make such arguments orally if
their interest in doing so is "sufficient." Id. art. 13(1).
33. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
34. Id. art. 3(I)(a)-(b).
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possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking. ' 35 A merger
subject to notification may thus be found to occur in a number of situations.
1. Joint Ventures
Certain forms of joint ventures are explicitly within the scope of the regula-
tion, namely those that do not give rise to coordination of the competitive
behavior of the parties among themselves or between them and the joint ven-
ture.36 Those that fail this requirement remain subject to existing competition law
provisions, particularly articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome as implemented
by Regulation No. 17. In Nestld and Baxter's proposed acquisition of joint
control of the activities of Salvia Werk GmbH through the creation of a new
corporate entity, the Commission determined that the transaction did not consti-
tute a concentration within the meaning of article 3 of the regulation, but that
article 85 could still be applied.37 For the purposes of the Merger Control
Regulation, the distinction between situations of concentration and cooperation
is quite complex. Because of this complexity the Commission has drafted the
Notice on Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, which is designed to assist
in the interpretation of this subject.
A joint venture 38 requires notice when it has been established on a lasting
basis to perform all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, 39 and, as
such, acts as an independent supplier and buyer on the market. 4° With respect to
35. Id. art. 3(3) states two particular examples of such controls, which are -(a) ownership or the
right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; (b) rights or contracts which confer decisive
influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking."
36. Id. art. 3(2).
37. Agence Europe, No. 5432, Feb. 15, 1991, at 13; see appendix item 13.
38. Notice on Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 14, §§ 11-14. For there to
be a joint venture, according to the Commission, an operation must be jointly controlled by several
other undertakings. Such control can be predicated on legal, contractual, or other bases such as
ownership or the right to use all or some of the joint venture's assets; influence over the composition,
voting or the decision making of the managing or supervisory bodies within the joint venture; voting
rights in the managing or supervisory bodies; or contracts concerning the running of the joint venture
business. Id.
Joint control exists in every case where the parent companies must agree on decisions concerning
the joint venture's activities. Joint control is presumed not to exist where one of the parent companies
for example, has the right to appoint more than half of the managing or supervisory bodies, or more
than half of the votes in one of those bodies, or has the sole right to manage the undertaking's
business. Id. A joint venture, however, can be controlled by a considerable number of other under-
takings that can, together, muster a majority of the capital or the voting power of a joint venture's
decision-making bodies. In such cases, the Commission notes that joint control can be presumed
when factual and legal circumstances support the notion of a deliberate common policy of the parent
companies in relation to the joint venture. Id.
39. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(2); Notice on Concentrative and Coopera-
tive Operations, supra note 14, § 15(1).
40. Notice on Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 14, § 16. The Commission
notes that joint ventures that take over from their parents only specific partial responsibilities such as
research and development, obtaining or granting licenses, purchasing, production or distribution, are
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the requirement of a long-term existence,41 the human and material resources
committed to the joint venture are a key element as they must ensure the joint
venture's existence and independence in the long-term. As such, where parent
companies fail to invest substantial financial means in the joint venture or to
transfer existing businesses or to grant substantial technical or commercial know-
how to it, such that the venture remains economically integrated with the parent
company, it is less likely that the joint venture will meet the definition. 42 Like-
wise, a joint venture falling within the scope of regulation must exercise its own
commercial policy such that it plans, decides, and acts independently, without
regard to the market-related interests of the parent companies.4 3
For joint ventures to be considered within the scope of the Merger Control
Regulation, the Commission requires that they should not be accompanied by
any coordination with the competitive behavior of the parent companies, which
must remain independent of one another, or between all of the parents on one side
and the joint venture on the other.44 The Commission notes that not every form
of cooperation between parent companies with regard to their joint ventures will
render the joint venture beyond the scope of the regulation because concentrative
joint ventures, like others, can represent a regular means for the parent compa-
nies to pursue common or mutually complementary interests. However, such
cooperation will be accepted by the Commission only as long as the competitive
behavior of the parent companies and that of the joint ventures are left uninflu-
enced by it.
4 5
In distinguishing between the permissible pursuit of common interests be-
tween joint venturers and the coordination of competitive behavior that would
render a venture beyond the Merger Control Regulation's scope, the Commission
distinguishes several scenarios. In certain situations, the joint venture will
clearly be subject to notification. In the event that the joint venture incorporates
the preexisting activities of the parent companies while the parent companies
merely pursuing activities that are auxiliaries to the commercial activities of the parents. Therefore,
they are outside the scope of article 3(2) of the Merger Control Regulation. Id.
41. In an earlier draft of the notice, the Commission noted that this period should not normally
be less than twenty years because a life expectancy of an "appreciably less" period of time does not
anticipate a long-term change in the structures of the parent companies. Draft Commission Notice of
27 March 1990 on the Definition of Concentrations and Cooperation under Council Regulation No.
4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, EuR. CoM.
Doc. No. IV/197/90 § II (b)(1)(d) (1990).
42. Notice on Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 14, § 17.
43. Id. § 19. The Commission, however, notes that the economic independence of a joint venture
will not be contested merely because its commercial policy as a whole is examined by the parent
company or in the event that the parent companies reserve the rights to make certain decisions that are
important for the development of the joint venture, such as those concerning alterations of the
objectives of the company, increases or reductions of capital, or the application of profits.
44. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(2); Notice on Concentrative and Coopera-
tive Operations, supra note 14, §§ 20-30.
45. Notice on Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 14, § 21.
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withdraw permanently, as suppliers or as customers, from the joint venture's
market and either transfer their entire business assets to the joint venture, hence-
forth acting as holding companies (a complete merger), or transfer to the joint
venture activities that the parent formerly carried on independently and only in
certain commercial sectors (partial merger), the operation requires notice.46
An example of such an arrangement can be seen in AG and AMEV's creation
of two joint enterprises that would carry out all of the activities of the parent
companies, leaving the parents as mere holding companies. a7 Also illustrating
this are Adrospatiale and MBB's joint control of the new holding company,
Eurocopter,48 which would undertake the parent's activities in the helicopter
market, as well as Varta Batteries A.G. and Robert Bosch GmbH's creation of
a new enterprise49 in which the activities of the parent With respect to auto
batteries would be transferred.
Another scenario envisaged by the Commission concerns joint ventures that
undertake new activities on behalf of parent companies. The Commission con-
siders such arrangements to be within the scope of the Merger Control Regula-
tion if the joint ventures' market was neither upstream nor downstream of, nor
horizontally close to, that of the parent companies, as the risk of coordination
would seem unlikely in such a case.
50
The Commission, on the other hand, deems beyond the scope of the Merger
Control Regulation the situation where one or both of the parent companies
remained active on the joint venture's market, unless the presumption of coor-
dination of competitive behavior is rebutted. 5 1 Furthermore, while the Commis-
sion does not presume anticompetitive cooperation, it is indeed wary of such a
relationship where the joint venture operates in a market that is vertically or
horizontally close to those of its parents. 52 Thus, where the parents are not
competitors, the Commission normally finds a coordination of competitive be-
havior where the joint venture makes sales or purchases in substantial measure
with the parents. Additionally, where the joint venture and parent companies
operate in horizontally close markets, the Commission treats the joint venture as
within the scope of the Merger Control Regulation only if there exists "no
concrete opportunities for competitive interaction. ' 53 As such, they examine
whether the products of the parent and joint venture are technically or econom-
46. Id. § 24-26. The Commission does, however, contemplate that joint ventures where parent
companies remain permanently active on the joint ventures' product or service market, while with-
drawing from the joint ventures' geographic market (taking into account the nature of the goods or
services concerned) may also fall within the scope of the Merger Control Regulation. Id. § 29.
47. See appendix item 2.
48. See appendix item 17.
49. See appendix item 21.
50. Notice on Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 14, § 31.
51. Id. § 33.
52. Id. § 35.
53. Id. § 36.
FALL 1991
624 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
ically linked, whether they are both components of a complex product or oth-
erwise mutually complementary, and whether it is economical for the parent
companies to enter the joint venture's market.54
2. Other Transactions Submitted to Notification
Apart from joint ventures, the Commission has also considered the inclusion
of other associations between undertakings and forms of joint operation that
may meet the definitional requirements of the Merger Control Regulation. The
Commission notes for example that the acquisition of a minority shareholding
in an undertaking can be subject to notification only if the new shareholder
acquires the means of exercising a decisive influence on the undertaking's
activity.5 5 Like the acquisition of shares in a business in which a competitor
also has an interest, it remains fully subject to articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty. The Commission also may consider within the scope of the Merger
Control Regulation the exchange of shareholdings of separate companies as a
means of establishing either a "single economic entity" or a combined group.
56
In order for such mergers by combination to fall within the coverage of the
Regulation, the parties involved must be subject to permanent and single
economic management such that they are amalgamated into a genuine economic
unit sharing joint liability as well as profit and loss compensation between the
various members.
5 7
An illustration of this situation can be seen in Renault and Volvo's transaction
whereby these companies would create joint management committees for re-
search and development, manufacturing, purchasing, and cooperation with third
parties.58 That transaction would also involve Renault's taking 25 percent of the
shares of Volvo Cars Corporation and 45 percent of the shares of Volvo Trucks
Corporation, while Volvo would purchase 20 percent of Renault's shares as well
as 45 percent of Renault Vehicules Industriels. Similarly, Mitsubishi's acquisi-
tion of 50 percent of the shares of Ucar Carbon, a subsidiary of Union-Carbide,
would operate to render Mitsubishi and Union-Carbide a common enterprise
pursuant to the merger control regulation. 59
According to the Commission, representation of one undertaking on the
decision-making body of another, whether or not accompanied by shareholdings,
may, depending on the circumstances, serve as a vehicle for either coordination
of competitive behavior or as a concentration covered by the Merger Control
54. Id. § 36.
55. Id. § 37-38.
56. Id. § 40. It is interesting that the Commission considers that two or more undertakings may
merge without setting up a parent-subsidiary relationship and without losing their legal personality.
Id. §41.
57. id. § 41.
58. See appendix item 1.
59. See appendix item 7.
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Regulation. 6° Obviously, a transfer of assets or shares may also constitute a
merger subject to notification when the transfer results in the acquisition of
control of all or part of one or more undertakings. 61 For example, Alcatel, by
virtue of its holding 61.5 percent of the shares of CGE, triggered a full-scale
investigation by the Commission due to CGE's acquisition of 69.2 percent of
the capital of Telettra SpA from Fiat, which was to remain holding 25.4 percent
of Telettra SpA's capital. 62 The Commission suggests that the unilateral
acquisition of assets creates a strong presumption that the Merger Control
Regulation shall apply. As such, various tender offers have been notified to the
Commission, including Matsushita's bid for MCA, AT&T's bid for NCR, and
Tetrapak's bid for Alfa Laval. 63 However, this presumption may be rebutted by
objective evidence of the parties' competitive behavior. Reciprocal arrange-
ments, on the other hand, will most likely result in a coordination of behaviors
to which the Merger Control Regulation is not applicable and that therefore
remain covered by articles 85 and 86.64 Finally, the Commission notes that the
joint acquisition of an undertaking with a view to its division may also be
deemed a concentration, unless it is designed to coordinate the competitive




The Merger Control Regulation does not exclude from its scope mergers
involving restrictions deemed "directly related and necessary to the accomplish-
ment of the concentration.' 66 Furthermore, it provides that a decision declaring
a merger compatible with the EEC Treaty, that is to say a cleared merger, shall
also cover restrictions meeting this criteria. 6 7 Since in this situation the Regu-
lation excludes the application of other EC competition provisions, 68 there is "no
danger of parallel proceedings," as noted by the Commission in the Notice on
Ancillary Restraints it recently published in an effort to clarify the application of
the Merger Control Regulation to such ancillary restrictions.69
According to the Commission, the Merger Control Regulation contemplates
only those restrictions that are "agreed on between the parties . . . which limit
their own freedom of action in the market." 70 With regards to the requirement
60. Notice on Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 14, §§ 42-45.
61. Id. § 46.
62. See appendix item 10.
63. See appendix items 8, 9, 19.
64. Notice on Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 14, § 47.
65. Id. § 48.
66. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, preamble.
67. Id. art. 8(2).
68. Id. art. 22(l)-(2).
69. Notice on Ancillary Restraints, supra note 13, § 1.
70. Id. § 3. It does not apply to restrictive "effects" on third parties resulting from the merger.
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that restrictions be "directly related" to the merger, the Commission excludes
those that are integral parts of the merger itself, such as restrictions designed to
organize the common control or establish economic unity between two previ-
ously independent businesses. 7' It also excludes agreements that have no eco-
nomic link to it, although executed in the context of the merger.
The Commission appears to apply its most stringent analysis to the Regula-
tion's requirement that ancillary restrictions be necessary to the implementation
of the concentration. Not only is it necessary that the absence of restrictions
render the merger impossible or impracticable, but their duration, subject matter,
and geographic field of application must not exceed what is reasonably required
for the implementation of the merger. 7
2
71. Id. § 4. Thus, for example, where a merger is carried out in stages the Commission excludes
those interim agreements from the scope of the Regulation.
72. Although the Commission concedes that its interpretive guidelines must be applied in line
with decisional practice, it does provide the position that the Commission could possibly take with
respect to several ancillary restrictions, commonly utilized within the context of total or partial asset
transfers, and divisions of corporate entities or the assets pursuant to a joint acquisition, or the
creation of a joint venture.
Noncompetition clauses, when utilized in the context of a transfer of both tangible and intangible
assets, such as client lists, or know-how, are considered within the scope of the Merger Control
Regulation, when such restrictions are necessary to safeguard the value of the assets acquired and
their geographic field, and subject matter and duration do not exceed what is reasonably necessary
for such purpose. In regard to durational limits, the Commission recognizes as reasonable five-year
durations for know-how and two-year durations for goodwill. Longer periods may be permissible as
in the case of high-technology products. The Notice provides stricter guidelines on geographic and
subject matter restrictions of noncompetition clauses limiting them respectively to "the area where
the vendor had established the products or services before the transfer" and to "products and services
which form the economic activity of the undertaking transferred." Id. § II(A)(l)-(6).
Intellectual property right and licenses know-how may also fall within the scope of the Merger
Control Regulation when such are "necessary" for the completion of the transaction. Simple or
exclusive patent licenses, similar rights, or existing know-how may be limited to a certain range of
use, such that they correspond to the activities of the undertaking transferred. Licenses may be
granted for the whole duration of the patent or similar rights or to the "normal economic life of the
know-how." It is unclear how the Commission will treat territorial restrictions in this context as the
Notice merely states that such limitations "normally will not be necessary." Also, restrictions in
licensing agreements, going beyond what is provided by the Notice, fall outside the Regulation, and
may be assessed according to articles 85(1) and 85(3) of the Treaty, unless they benefit from block
exemptions such as those provided for in the Regulation on the Application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 219) 15
(1984), and the Regulation on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories
of Know-how Licensing Agreements, 32 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 61) 1 (1989). Notice on Ancillary
Restraints, supra note 13, § If(B)(l)-(4).
The Notice also allows for the inclusion of "exclusive supply" agreements meeting the "neces-
sity" requirement. It limits the duration of such arrangements to two years as they view such
restrictions as justified merely for transitional purposes. Id. § HI(C)(l)-(4). Certain ancillary restric-
tions may also fall within the scope of the Merger Control Regulation when utilized in the context
of a joint venture. So long as restrictions do not lead to coordination of the competitive behavior of
the parent entities, arrangements to abstain from launching separate offers, as well as those designed
to divide production facilities, distribution networks or transfer intellectual property rights or other
assets may all be allowed. Id. 88 IV-V.
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B. THE THRESHOLDS: THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY DIMENSION
Not all deals that fall within the Merger Control Regulation's definition of a
concentration must be notified due to the requirement of community dimen-
sion. 73 Arjomari-Prioux's acquisition of Wiggins, Teape, Appleton74 was deemed
not to have met the Regulation's threshold on December 10, 1990. The Merger
Control Regulation distinguishes between transactions with an impact that tran-
scends the national borders of any one Member State, to which it grants the
Commission exclusive jurisdiction, and those transactions that do not have such
impact, and are left within the jurisdiction of national authorities. 75 Therefore, if
each of the involved undertakings achieve more than two-thirds of its aggregate
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State, the Regulation
states that Community dimension will not be deemed to exist.7 6 The Commission
provides an example of the application of this two-thirds rule in an appendix to
the Commission Regulation on Notifications.77
Community dimension exists where the aggregate worldwide turnover of all
the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 5 billion (roughly $6 billion) and
the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the under-
takings concerned is more than ECU 250 million ($300 million).78 Article 5 of
the Merger Control Regulation defines aggregate turnover to "comprise the
amounts derived by the undertakings concerned in the preceding financial year
for the sale of products and the provision of services falling within the under-
takings' ordinary activities after deduction of sales rebates, VAT and of other
taxes directly related to turnover." Sales by related entities are included, while
intragroup sales are not included. Special rules apply with regard to the aggregate
turnover of banks and financial institutions ,79 and as these special rules cause
some problems of interpretation, the Commission also provides some examples
of how they should apply.
80
A special rule also applies to acquisitions of a part or parts of businesses. In
this case only the turnover of the acquired part or parts is taken into account in
the computation, insofar as the seller is concerned. To prevent any abuse of this
rule, it is further provided that two or more similar operations taking place within
a period of two years will constitute a single such operation.
s t
73. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, arts. 1(1) and 1(2).
74. See appendix item 4.
75. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, preamble, para. 13, states that "it should apply
to significant structural changes, the impact of which goes beyond the national borders of any one
Member State."
76. Id. art. 1(2).
77. Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, ann. I, Guidance Note IV.
78. Id. art. I(2)(A)-(B). This threshold will be reviewed before the end of the fourth year
following the adoption of the Regulation. Id. art. 1(2)(C).
79. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 5(3).
80. Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, ann. I, Guidance Notes I & II.
81. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
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II. Contents of the Notification
Perhaps the most significant offering of the Merger Control Regulation is the
institution of mandatory notification of mergers to the Commission.82 A detailed
list of materials required for submission is set forth by the Commission Regu-
lation on Notifications.
Parties may be faced with the prospect of having to decide whether to give
notice of the agreement to the Commission by seeking either negative clearance
or individual exemption under article 85 of the EEC Treaty83 or whether to
notify pursuant to the Merger Control Regulation's procedures. Informal
preliminary discussions with the Commission may be somewhat helpful in
making this decision. In the event that a merger is nevertheless notified
pursuant to the procedures of the Merger Control Regulation, but is ultimately
deemed to fall beyond the Regulation's scope, the Commission, upon the
written request of the parties, shall treat the application as one for exemption or
negative clearance pursuant to the provisions of article 85, subsections (1) and
(3) of the EEC Treaty.84
All mergers falling within the scope of the Merger Control Regulation must be
notified on the mandatory form annexed to the Commission Regulation on No-
tifications.8 5 According to the Commission, the Form is designed to "simplify
and expedite examination of the notification" procedures. 86 While experience
may confirm or deny the truth of this, the information to be gathered, developed,
and submitted by parties is quite extensive; it has been compared not to an initial
filing under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, but rather to a response to a second
request thereunder for additional documents and information. 87 However, some
attempt to limit this burden has been made by the Commission. The final text of
the Commission Regulation on Notifications provides that: "The Commission
may dispense with the obligation to provide any particular information requested
82. It is not obligatory to notify agreements falling within articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty
(see supra note 2). Nonetheless, formal notification is essential for obtaining protection from fines
and exemption from prohibition. Regulation No. 17, supra note 27, art. 15(5).
83. Negative clearance is a Commission determination that an agreement does not fall within
article 85(1) or 86 of the Treaty. An individual exemption is not available as to article 86, but allows
the Commission to exempt agreements falling within article 85(1) on the grounds of article 85(3) if
it: contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and does not
impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of
these objectives; and affords such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect
of a substantial part of the products in question. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 85(3). Unlike
applications for individual exemptions, those for negative clearance alone do not protect notifying
parties from fines. In practice, both are notified simultaneously on the same form. See supra C.
BELLAMY & G. CHILD, supra note 11, §§ 11-001 to 11-022.
84. Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, art. 5.
85. Form, supra note 11, part (A).
86. Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, 4.
87. Reasoner, Comments of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law with Respect
to the Draft Form Notification of a Concentration, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 263 (1990).
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by form CO where the Commission considers that such information is not nec-
essary for the examination of the case."
88
Mergers stricto sensu or acquisitions of joint control must be notified jointly
by the parties to the merger or the acquirers of joint control. 89 In all other cases,
notifications are effected by the person or undertaking acquiring control of the
whole or parts of one or more undertakings. 9° Twenty copies of each notification
and fifteen copies of all supporting documentation 9 must be submitted to the
Directorate General for Competition.92 The copies must be in one of the official
languages of the Community, the language being that of the proceeding as it
concerns the parties.
93
A. GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE PARTIES
The parties may specify an address for service in Brussels, "if available"; 94 where
notification is made by representatives of the parties, they must produce written proof
of their authority. 95 In addition, a joint representative must be appointed by the parties
in the case of joint notifications. 96 The Commission Regulation on Notifications
requires that all information requested in the Form be supplied.97
The parties must give a brief description of the nature of the concentration
stating, among other things, whether the proposed concentration is a full legal
merger, an acquisition, a joint venture or another means conferring direct or
indirect control. 98 In describing the nature of the concentration, the notice also
requires a description of whether whole or parts of concerned parties are subject
to it.99 Furthermore, the parties must state whether any public offer for the se-
curities of one party by another has the support of the corporate bodies repre-
senting the target. t00 The parties must also note the economic sectors involved.'
88. Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, art. 4(3).
89. Form, supra note 11, part (B)(1).
90. Id. part B(2).
91. Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, art. 2(2). See also Form, supra
note I1, part (D)(6). Note that these may be either original or certified copies.
92. Form, supra note 11, part (D)(7). This part provides that notifications be sent to:
Commission of the European Communities
Directorate General for Competition (DGIV)
Merger Task Force (Cort. 150)
200, me de la Loi
B-1049 Brussels.
93. Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, art. 2(4). See also Form, supra
note 11, (D)(1).
94. Form, supra note II, part (D), § 1(3).
95. Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, art. 1(2); Form, supra note 11,
§ 1(4).
96. Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, art. 1(3).
97. Id. art. 3.
98. Form, supra note 11, § 2(1).
99. Id. § 2(1). As noted above, this may be determinant with respect to the applicable thresholds.
See also Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
100. Form, supra note 11, § 2(1).
101. Id. § 2(2).
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The Form also requires the submission of a brief explanation of the economic
and financial details of the merger. The parties must provide information with
regard to any financial or other support from whatever source by any of the
parties; the nature and amount of this support; 0 2 the proposed or expected date
of any major events designed to bring about the completion of the concentra-
tion, 0 3 and the proposed structure of ownership and control after completion of
the concentration."°4 As to the financial positions of the parties, data must be
furnished for each of the parties over the past three financial years with regard to
worldwide turnover, Community-wide turnover, turnover in each Member State,
profits before tax worldwide, number of employees, and the Member State in
which more than two-thirds of Community-wide turnover is achieved before
taxable profits and employees' salaries. 105
The direct and indirect ownership and control of the parties involved in the
concentration is another focus of the Form. It therefore requires the parties to
provide a list of all companies or persons controlling the parties, or controlled by
them directly or indirectly, which together are characterized as a group. The
notion of control is defined by the Merger Control Regulation, to which the Form
refers, as the possibility to exert a material influence on another business's
activity. 10 6 Notifying parties must also provide details of all acquisitions made by
controlled or controlling entities within the past three years within affected
markets.' 0 7 The "personal and financial links" between each member of the
group, including those deemed to be controlled or controlling entities of the
actual parties to the merger themselves, together with other businesses in which they
hold 10 percent or more of the voting rights, or which hold 10 percent or more of
their voting rights, must also be disclosed if said businesses "are active on
affected markets." 108 Furthermore, a complete list of their directors' °9 who are also
directors of other corporations "active on affected markets" is required.110
102. Id. § 2(3).
103. Id. § 2(3). In an earlier draft of the Form, the Commission required the submission of
detailed information concerning the value and form of consideration offered or agreed upon, as well
as the means of raising such consideration pursuant to the formation of a concentration.
104. Id. § 2(3).
105. Id. § 2(4). It is immediately apparent that the Commission will use this information in
appreciating whether the merger meets the triggering mechanism of article 1(2) of the Merger Control
Regulation.
106. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(3).
107. Form, supra note 11, § 3. Note that all responses may include charts or diagrams that
illustrate the preconcentration structure of ownership and control. This information is relevant not
only for determining whether the merger falls within the scope of the Merger Control Regulation
pursuant to article 1(2), (3), and (4), but also for substantively assessing the merger itself, as the
competitive situation on the relevant market is obviously its focus. Merger Control Regulation, supra
note 1, art. 2. See, e.g., Thieffry, supra note 1, at 549.
108. Form, supra note 11, § 4(1)-(2).
109. Form, supra note 11, § 4(3). The phrases used by the Form are "board of management" and
"board of supervision." They reflect the internal organization of most corporations in Europe.
110. Id. § 4(3). Note that here too charts and diagrams may be submitted.
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The notifying parties are also obliged to accompany the notification with the
following: (a) copies of the final or most recent versions of all documents bring-
ing about the concentration, whether by agreement between the parties con-
cerned, acquisition of a controlling interest, or a public bid; (b) in a public bid,
a copy of the offer document; if unavailable on notification, it should be sub-
mitted as soon as possible and not later than when it is sent to shareholders; (c)
copies of the most recent annual reports of all the parties to the concentration.' 1'
B. SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THE "AFFEcTED MARKETs"
Section Five of the Form defines "affected markets" as well as "product
markets" and the "relevant geographic market." Product markets comprise: "all
products and/or services that are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by
the consumer by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their
intended use." 11 2 The Form further specifies that a "relevant product market"
may be composed of several "individual product groups," that is to say of
groups of products "which present largely identical physical or technical char-
acteristics and are fully interchangeable." 113 The Commission, however, fails to
give any clue whatsoever as to which criteria are to be applied in determining the
interchangeability or substitutability of the products. The notifying parties will
thus candidly retain the widest margin of appreciation in making their evalua-
tions and cannot be criticized if they rely on first impressions favorable to their
positions. The Commission, on the other hand, is obviously not bound by the
parties' statements in these respects and is free to apply more sophisticated
analyses such as those based on cross-elasticities. As to the "relevant geographic
market," it is quite simply defined in the Form as: "the area in which the
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply of products or services, in
which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can
be distinguished from neighboring areas because, in particular, conditions of
competition are appreciably different in those areas."
1 14
The focus of the Form's queries is neither the product market or individual
product group nor the relevant geographic market, but rather their intersection,
referred to by the Commission as the "affected market." As a result, the bulk of
the substantive information required 1 5 for the notification relates only to the
relevant product markets or individual product groups in the relevant geographic
111. Id. part (C).
112. Id. § 5.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Based on an earlier draft of the Form, the requirements of which were subsequently some-
what reduced, a task force of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law estimated that the cost of developing
the information necessary for a notification amounted to several hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars
because it will require the parties to engage in extensive consulting with competent experts. See
Reasoner, supra note 74, at 263.
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market or markets where any of the parties, or any of the members of the groups
to which they belong, hold market shares of 10 percent or more (i) together in the
case of a horizontal relationship, 1 6 or (ii) on any of the concerned markets in the
case of a vertical relationship.'
1 7
The Form mandates that data be provided as to the concentrations' market
aspects based on the above described concepts and on what appear to be de facto
triggers. Notifying parties must describe the products or services constituting the
relevant product market and explain why these are included in the definition
while others are excluded by reason of their characteristics, prices, and intended
uses. 118 The following information is required for each of the last three fiscal
years, for the Community as a whole and individually for each Member State,
and where different, for any relevant geographical market. With respect to each
affected market the required information is: an estimate of the value of the
market and volume where appropriate;1 19 the turnover 120 and the estimated mar-
ket share of each of the groups to which the parties belong;121 an estimate of the
market share of all competitors having at least 10 percent of the geographic
market under consideration,122 a comparison of prices charged by the groups to
which the parties belong in each of the Member States, and a similar comparison
to such price levels between the Community and its major trading partners; 123 an
estimate of the value and source of imports to the relevant geographic market,
and the proportion of such imports that derive from undertakings belonging to
the same group;' 24 and the extent such imports are governed by any tariffs or
nontariff barriers to trade. 125
Section Five of the Annex contains a special provision for "conglomer-
ates." 126 Under this provision, if any of the parties or members of their groups,
in the absence of vertical or horizontal relationships, hold a market share of 25
percent or more of any product market or individual product group, then the
regulation requires the submission of a description of each relevant product
market and a list describing the individual product groups thereof. In addition,
116. Consider, for example, the situation where two or more parties are engaged in business
activities in the same product market and where the concentration will lead to a combined market
share of 10 percent or more.
117. A vertical relationship exists where any of the concerned parties is engaged in business
activities in a product market which is upstream or downstream of a product market in which any
other concerned party is engaged and any of their market shares is 10 percent or more, regardless of
whether there is or is not an existing supplier/customer relationship between the concerned parties.
118. Form, supra note 11, § 5(1).
119. Id. § 5(3).
120. Id. § 5(4).
121. Id. § 5(5).
122. Id. § 5(6).
123. Id. § 5(6).
124. Id. § 5(8) & (9).
125. Id. § 5(10).
126. Id. § 5(11)-(13).
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such parties must submit an estimate of the market value and share of each of the
groups to which the parties belong for each affected relevant product market over
the last financial year for the Community as a whole, individually for each
Member State where the groups to which the parties belong do business, and
where different, for any relevant geographic market.
Section Six of the Annex relates to the state of the market itself and may be
the single most important section, as most of the information above relates to
issues of jurisdiction and scope. In addition, it may be the market for which
existing Community provisions are the most inadequate. Section Six requires
information concerning general conditions in the affected markets. The Com-
mission seeks an opportunity to examine the degree of market entry, by requiring
the delivery of information on significant entries into the affected markets in the
Community over the prior five-year period, including the entrants' market
shares, as well as the parties' opinions as to the possibility of potential new
market entrants.1 27 Parties are also obliged to describe various factors that in-
fluence entry into affected markets, taking into account the total costs of entry
and the extent to which entry is influenced by factors such as governmental
authorization or regulation, the availability of raw materials, the length of con-
tracts between an undertaking and its suppliers, its customers or both, and the
licensing of patents, know-how, and other rights.
1 28
Not surprisingly, detailed information must be supplied regarding the degree of
vertical integration between the parties,1 29 as well as the extent of research and
development,1 30 cooperative agreements,131 and the existing distribution chan-
nels and service networks' impact upon the relevant markets. 1 32 The Annex also
requires a description of the competitive environment of the affected market,
including the phases of the markets, 133 the structure of demand
1 34 and supply,' 35
a profile of the typical supplier and customer of each group, and details on the
ten largest customers1 36 and suppliers of the notifying parties. 137 The notifying
party is also required to give its opinion on the role of public authorities, gov-
ernment agencies, and state enterprises as sources of supply and demand. 138 The
parties must explain the total Community-wide capacity for the past three years
127. Id. § 6(1)-(2).
128. Id. § 6(4).
129. Id. § 6(5).
130. Id. § 6(6).
131. Id. § 6(11).
132. Id. § 6(7).
133. Id. § 6(10). This subsection states that parties must express market phases in terms of
take-off, expansion, maturity, and decline.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. § 6(9). This subsection requires the giving of names, addresses and contacts.
137. Id. § 6(8).
138. Id. § 6(10).
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in relation to the parties' capacity utilization 139 and describe the worldwide
context of proposed concentration, indicating the position of the parties in this
market. 140 The notifying parties are also obliged to accompany the notification
with copies of reports or analyses, which have been prepared for the purposes of
the concentration and from which information has been taken in order to provide
the information requested in Sections Five and Six. 141
C. ANTICIPATED EFFECT OF THE MERGER
Section Seven allows the parties to describe how the proposed concentration
is likely to affect the interests of intermediate and ultimate consumers and the
development of technical and economic progress. 142 The notifying parties are
also obliged to accompany the notification with a list and short description of the
contents of all analyses, reports, studies, and surveys prepared by or for any of
the notifying parties for the purpose of assessing or analyzing the proposed
concentration with respect to competitive conditions, competitors (actual and
potential), and market conditions. Each item in the list must include the name
and position of the author. 1
43
Under the final provisions of the draft Annex the parties would have been
afforded the opportunity, not unlike that provided in the A/B Form t44 used to
notify the Commission of other European competition matters, to state the fac-
tors they believed should be considered in assessing the concentration in terms of
the achievement of the fundamental objectives of the European Community,
including those of strengthening the Community's economic and social cohe-
sion. Although frequently and thoroughly used, this opportunity was withheld
from the final version of the Form. The parties' arguments in favor of the merger
are therefore developed only at a later stage, as discussed below.
III. Consequences of Non-Compliance with
the Regulation's Requirements
Among the premises of the Merger Control Regulation is that the Commission
should have "the task of taking all decisions necessary to establish whether or
139. Id.
140. Id. § 6(14).
141. Id. part (C):
142. Id. § 7(1).
143. Id. part (C).
144. The Form A/B, as revised on January 1, 1986, copies of which are obtainable from the
Commission's information offices, may be used both as an application for negative clearance or as
a notification for the purpose of obtaining an exemption from the application of the Community's
competition rules. The Form requires only the identity of the parties, the purpose of the application,
the full details of the agreement, a description of the relevant market, information about the business,
turnover and market share of the parties, the arguments relied on, and other relevant information. See
C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, supra note 12, § 11-062.
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not concentrations of Community dimension are compatible with the Common
Market, as well as decisions designed to restore effective competition." 145 The
Commission may also attach to its decisions conditions and obligations intended
to ensure that parties comply with modifications they undertook to make to the
proposed merger during their discussions with the Commission. 146 To this end,
the Council considered that the Commission must be empowered to "require
information to be given and to carry out the necessary investigations." 147 It also
granted the Commission the sanctioning power necessary for the effectiveness
thereof, subject to the principle that enforcement must be by means of fines and
periodic penalty payments comparable to those imposed for civil contempt (as-
treintes), 148 with the Court of Justice having exclusive jurisdiction thereupon. 149
The Regulation provides some safeguards as to the rights of the parties by
providing the right to a hearing in the event that a decision is to be considered
regarding fines and periodic penalty payments. 150 Having unlimited jurisdiction,
the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice may cancel, reduce, or
increase the fine or periodic payment imposed. 151
The extent of the Commission's powers pursuant to the other EC provisions on
competition have in recent years given rise to a significant body of case law that
should more or less readily apply to proceedings conducted pursuant to the
Merger Control Regulation in view of the similarity of its provisions with those
of Regulation 17. In the context of the investigation procedure the Court of
Justice has ruled that in the case where a party fails to provide requested infor-
mation, the Commission may not render a decision fixing the amount of a fine or
periodic penalty payment until after the party is given the opportunity to be heard
on the matter. 152 Since the Commission's power to fine entails two stages-the
decision to impose the fine and the decision fixing the amount thereof-interested
parties should be wary of the Commission's power to decide to fine without
granting a right to a hearing or consulting with the advisory committee. 
153
Companies nevertheless do enjoy certain fundamental rights. For example, in
145. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, preamble 20.
146. Id. art. 8(2). This procedure is also followed by the Commission with respect to its conduct
concerning article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty (see supra note 2).
147. Id. preamble 25.
148. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 15(3). As an incentive for compliance, and
following the Civil Law practice of astreintes, the Regulation states that the total amount of periodic
penalty payments may be set at a lower figure than that arising under the original agreement when
the concerned undertakings have satisfied the obligations to which the periodic penalty applied.
149. Id. preamble 26.
150. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18 (1).
151. Id. art. 16. Where ajudgment is rendered annulling whole or part of a Commission decision,
the time periods laid down shall start again from the dates of the judgment. Id. art. 10(5).
152. Case 374/87 Orkem (previously CdF Chimie) v. Commission of the European Communities
26 (not yet reported) [hereinafter Orkem].
153. Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst A.G. v. Commission of the European Communities (not yet
reported) [hereinafter Hoechst].
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cases where the validity of Commission decisions ordering verification investi-
gations has successfully been challenged before the Court of Justice, 154 resulting
in the decisions being set aside, the Commission is denied the right to use
documents obtained in violation of a company's fundamental rights in subse-
quent investigations. 155
A. FAILURE TO NOTIFY
Mergers may not be put into effect either until the notification is filed or within
the first three weeks following such filing. 156 In addition, the Commission may
decide to extend this period of suspension for the entire duration of its investi-
gation. 157 Public bids, which must be notified by the day of its announcement,
may be realized within this time period on the condition that the acquirer does not
exercise the voting power attached to the acquired shares.' 
58
The possible effects of the injunctive power of the Commission are remark-
able. The Commission has the power to require of implemented concentrations
the bringing together or separation of assets, the cessation of joint control, or any
other action that may be appropriate to restore the conditions of effective com-
petition. 159 In addition, the validity of the legal acts that effectuated the merger
is destroyed unless the merger is ultimately notified and cleared. 160 Although the
validity of transactions in securities traded in regulated exchanges is excepted,
the impact of this exception on the concerned overall merger is not specified.
Moreover, this exception does not apply in cases where the buyer and seller have
knowledge or imputed knowledge of the irregularity of the transaction. 161
The failure to notify of a merger falling within the scope of the Merger Control
Regulation, whether conscious or negligent, can also be punished by fines as-
sessed by the Commission. The Commission's sanctioning power, similar to that
provided in Regulation No. 17, accompanies the full array of Commission pow-
154. Id.; Case 85/87 Dow Benelux v. Commission of the European Communities (not yet re-
ported) [hereinafter Dow Benelux]. Cases 97/87, 98/87 and 99/87 Dow Chemical Iberica v. Com-
mission of the European Communities (not yet reported) [hereinafter Dow Chemical].
155. Dow Chemical, supra note 154.
156. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 7(1). It is noteworthy that under an earlier
draft of the Commission Regulation, absent force majeure, notifications submitted beyond the spec-
ified time limit or the extension periods would not bind the Commission to the one-month preliminary
review, and four-month investigatory time limits set forth in the Regulation. See Draft Commission
Regulation on Notifications, Time Limits and Hearings provided for by Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, EuR. COMM. Doc. No.
IV/156/90, art. 3(4) (1990).
157. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 7(2).
158. Id. art. 7(3). The Commission may grant a derogation from such a suspension when voting
rights are exercised in an effort to maintain the value of shares acquired.
159. Id. art. 8(4).
160. Id. art. 7(5).
161. Id.
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ers. t 6 2 The Commission has two categories of fines. The failure to notify a
merger within the scope of the Merger Control Regulation can be punished in
amounts varying between ECU 1,000 and ECU 50,000. 163 Under Regulation
No. 17, no fines are imposed for the mere failure to notify agreements or prac-
tices falling within the scope of article 85 of the EEC Treaty; the only sanction
is the inability to obtain an individual exemption, and the lack of a defense to the
subsequent imposition of fines upon a later Commission determination. The
Commission may also impose fines of up to 10 percent of the aggregate turnover
of the undertakings concerned where, either intentionally or negligently: the
parties proceed with the merger during the initial three-week period following
the notification, or thereafter if the stay is extended by the Commission pending
its investigation; or after the merger has been declared incompatible with the
Common Market; or if the parties fail to take the measures ordered by the
Commission designed to undo an already implemented concentration in order to
bring it into line with conditions of effective competition. 164 The most powerful
instrument of coercion available to the Commission is its ability to impose
penalties of up to ECU 100,000 for each day parties delay in complying with
Commission decisions, as calculated from the date set therein ordering parties to
comply with measures designed to bring already implemented concentrations
into line with conditions of effective competition or undo them. 1
65
B. INCOMPLETE OR INACCURATE NOTIFICATIONS
The Merger Control Regulation allows the Commission to obtain all necessary
information from the governments and competent authorities of Member States,
from all persons controlling the concerned businesses, and from the businesses
themselves. 166 This possibility exists in all circumstances and is not limited to
incomplete notifications. Similar to the provisions of Regulation No. 17, the
Merger Control Regulation provides a two-step process whereby the Commis-
sion is required to send a simple request for information to the parties, stating
the legal basis, purpose, and penalties for supplying incorrect information as per
the Merger Control Regulation1 67 while simultaneously submitting a copy to the
competent authority of the Member State wherein the party resides. 1
68
The case law developed in relation to other competition provisions should
equally govern in construing the power of the Commission to obtain information
162. Id. art. 14. As with Regulation No. 17, the Commission, in setting the amounts of fine, shall
regard "the nature and gravity of infringement." Id. art. 14(3). It should be noted that fines are not
of a criminal nature. Id. art. 14(4).
163. Id. art. 14(l)(a).
164. Id. art. 14(2)(b)-(c).
165. Id. art. 15(2)(b).
166. Id. art. 11(1).
167. Id. art. 11(3).
168. Id. art. 11(2).
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in the context of the Merger Control Regulation. The use of the Commission's
power of investigation must be justified by a showing of necessity. Of course, the
Commission is granted wide discretion in the determination of whether such
necessity has been shown. 16 9 In the ruling of AM & S, 170 the Court of Justice
noted that the Commission may demand those documents it deems necessary to
reveal a violation of competition rules. The Court further ruled that the deter-
mination of whether documents should or should not be presented is for the
Commission itself and not for interested parties or a third party or referee. The
determination as to whether the information requested or verification investiga-
tion sought is indeed necessary cannot be left entirely to the discretion of the
Commission. The Court of Justice is therefore empowered to verify whether the
measures of investigation decided upon by the Commission are excessive or
disproportionate. 1 7 1 The Court of Justice has recently clarified that the exercise
of investigative powers by the Commission must be such that they do not violate
the fundamental rights of the concerned party. 172
The Court of Justice also recently ruled that while the Commission may
require a company to furnish it with all necessary information pertaining to
competition matters, and to supply it with any documents in its possession
relating to those matters, even if they may ultimately show the existence of
anticompetitive behavior on the part of the company or of another company, the
Commission may not oblige a company to provide it with answers by which it
might be led to admit its own violation of competition provisions, as such is for
the Commission to prove. 173 Simply stated, the Commission may ask for facts
and documents, but cannot require a company to answer leading questions.
174
While this list is not exhaustive of the fundamental rights guaranteed to parties
subject to Commission investigation, it is clear that the Commission has a large
degree of power in competition matters and parties are generally subject to the
obligation of cooperating with investigatory measures.
If the recipient does not respond to the Commission's initial request for in-
formation, a fine is imposed similar to that which applies for failure to notify,
169. Case 136/79 National Panasonic (U.K.) Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities,
[1980] E.C.R. 2033, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682 (1980).
170. Case 155/79 AM & S Europe, Ltd. v. Commission of the European Economic Communities,
[1982] E.C.R. 1575, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757 (1982).
171. Orkem, supra note 152; Case 27/88 Solvay v. Commission of the European Economic
Communities 66 (not yet reported) [hereinafter Solvay].
172. It is interesting to note that one commentator has suggested that while such fundamental
rights have operated to overturn several Commission competition decisions, the Court of Justice
seems more impressed by arguments that allow a balance to be struck between the effective enforce-
ment of competition law and elemental procedural fairness, than by appeals to unassailable and
all-embracing "constitutional rights." Edward, Constitutional Rules of Community Law in EEC
Competition Cases, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 111, 137 (1990).
173. Orkem, supra note 152; Solvay, supra note 171.
174. Edward, supra note 172, at 137.
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ECU 1,000 to ECU 50,000.175 In the event that a party thereafter fails to comply
within the period fixed by the Commission, a formal decision specifying the
information requested, containing a fixed time for response, the penalties in the
event of noncompliance, and the right to review by the Court of Justice, 176 is to
be issued to that party as well as to the competent authority of the party's place
of residence. 177 In this formal decision, the Commission is not only again
required to recite the above mentioned possibility of fines but also that of peri-
odic penalty payments-designed to coerce the production of the information
sought-of up to ECU 25,000 per day.
178
The Commission may undertake all investigations it deems necessary "in
carrying out the duties assigned to it.' 17 9 However, the above requests for
information, which are made pursuant to article 11 of the Merger Control Reg-
ulation, may be addressed not only to "undertakings and associations of under-
takings," but also to the parties to the merger, whether businesses or individuals.
Conversely, investigations, provided for by article 13, may not be directed
against the latter. Commission officials may themselves conduct these investi-
gations pursuant to a warrant specifying their subject matter, purpose, and the
applicable penalties. 180 The competent authorities of the relevant Member States
are to be notified in "good time" of the investigation and the identities of the
authorized Commission officials. 18 In the alternative, the Commission may be
assisted by local officials' 8 2 or request the competent authorities of the Member
States to undertake investigations that it deemed necessary or ordered by formal
decision. 183
When conducting competition investigations local authorities must act on the
basis of a warrant issued by the local authority with jurisdiction, which must state
the subject matter and purpose of the investigation.' 84 Agents of the Commission
may in this case assist the local authorities in their investigation.' 85 If the Com-
mission issues a formal decision authorizing an investigation, then the Merger
Control Regulation provides that it is mandatory for "undertakings and associ-
ations of undertakings" to submit themselves thereto.' 86 Failing such submis-
sion, the Member State with jurisdiction must assist the Commission in enforcing
175. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 14(1).
176. Id. art. 11(5).
177. Id. art. 11(6).
178. Id. art. 15(1).
179. Id. art. 13(1). The Commission's officials are granted the same powers granted them under
Regulation No. 17.
180. Id. art. 13(2).
181. Id. art. 13(2).
182. Id. art. 13(5).
183. Id. art. 12. Note that this provision is similar to that contained in Regulation No. 17 (see note 23).
184. Id. art. 12(1).
185. Id. art. 12(20).
186. Id. art. 13(3).
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its decision. 187 As such, the agents in charge of the investigation may examine
books and other business records' 88 and take or demand copies of all extracts
from them.1 89 They may also "ask for oral explanations on the spot" 1 90 and
"enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings."1 91
Here again, preexisting caselaw provides an idea of the safeguards available to
the parties. For example, it has been held that the Commission must provide
justification for its decisions in this area, such that the objectives and goals of the
verification procedure must be made known to the parties subject thereto. 192 The
agents of the Commission at the time of a verification investigation may not force
access to a locale or to the personal property thereupon. Furthermore, Commis-
sion officials may not compel the personnel of a company to furnish them with
such access, nor attempt to search the premises without the authorization of those
accountable for the company.' 
93
In cases where measures of verification are not conducted with the collabo-
ration of the concerned company, the Commission must respect procedural guar-
antees provided for in this regard, by its national corporate law.' 94 By way of
clarification, businesses have a positive legal obligation to submit to an investi-
gation, to open files or cabinets, and to produce for inspection any document the
Commission wishes to see. But, if businesses refuse to cooperate, the Commis-
sion may have to rely on national authorities to force companies into compliance.
Thus, while the Commission need not specify precisely what it seeks to examine,
it does not have active powers of search. 195 Information gathered in the course
of a verification investigation may not be used for any purposes other than those
indicated within the mandate or decision of verification. The rights of defense or
procedural safeguards would be severely compromised if the Commission could
use evidence obtained in the course of a verification against individuals who were
strangers to the object and goal thereof. 196
The Merger Control Regulation and the Commission Regulation on Notifica-
tions contain a limited number of provisions dealing specifically with incomplete
or inaccurate notifications, as opposed to the general investigative powers dis-
cussed above. Fines ranging from ECU 1,000 to ECU 50,000 may be assessed
187. Id. art. 13(6). The Member States must adopt the provisions necessary therefor within one
year from the coming into force of the Merger Control Regulation, that is to say by September 21,
1991.
188. Id. art. 13(1)(a).
189. Id. art. 13(1)(b).
190. Id. art. 13(1)(c).
191. Id. art. 13(l)(d).
192. Hoechst, supra note 153, consideration 29.
193. Id. consideration 31.
194. Id. consideration 24.
195. Id.; see also Edward, supra note 172, at 137.
196. Dow Benelux, supra note 152, consideration 18.
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where the parties supply incorrect or misleading information in a notification, 197
just as in the above-mentioned cases when parties fail to notify or comply with
a request for information or investigation. Perhaps a stronger deterrent is that the
time periods imposed on the Commission to start and complete the procedure
begin to run only when the information filed is complete. 198 Because incorrect or
"misleading" information is deemed to constitute incomplete information, 19 9 it
appears that a notification could be deemed not to have occurred until all the
required information is filed, thereby extending the time periods exacted by the
regulations. For example, the Commission will stay the four-month time period,
during which it must issue its final decision on the merger, if it is compelled to
request information or proceed to an investigation, as discussed above, because
of circumstances for which one of the parties to the merger is responsible. 2°
Apparently, the Commission chose not to avail itself of the full extent of this
provision. In the Commission Regulation on Notifications suspension is limited
to specific instances in which it must take a formal decision due to a concerned
party's failure to comply with a request for information or investigation.2 °1 In
those cases the period of time will be suspended between the end of the time limit
granted within which to supply the requested information, 2 0 2 or the unsuccessful
attempt to carry out the investigation, 20 3 and the moment in time when such
failures are remedied. 2° In addition, the parties are required to inform the
Commission without delay of "material changes" in the facts specified in the
notification.20 5 The failure to comply with this requirement will similarly extend
the deadline for the Commission's work until the execution of the formal deci-
sion it is required to take by virtue of the material change in positions of the
206parties.
It is important to distinguish situations where the Commission dispenses with
the time limitations as opposed to merely suspending or tolling them, as in the
above instances where the Commission Regulation on Notifications specifies the
time limit of such suspensions as generally spanning the time from the moment
the Commission is denied its request for information, or an investigation or a
change in circumstances occurs, to the moment that compliance is had by the
Commission. However, where parties have either breached an obligation at-
tached to a decision of the Commission, or a Commission decision was based on
197. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 14(l)(b).
198. Id. art. 10 (1).
199. Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, art. 3(3).
200. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 10(4).
201. Commission Regulation on Notifications, supra note 11, art. 9(1)(a)-(b).
202. Id. art. 9(2)(a).
203. Id. art. 9(2)(b).
204. Id. art. 9(3).
205. Id. art. 3(3).
206. Id. art. 9(2)(c).
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incorrect information, these time limits are dispensed with and do not bar the
Commission from overturning a prior decision. 20 7 Yet, the fact that a clearance
decision may be repealed is the real deterrent and should be taken most seriously
by parties, despite the temptation of not drawing to the Commission's attention
those unfavorable aspects of their project that may exist. In addition to its power
to impose fines, the Commission may, by decision, force concerned parties to
make penalty payments of up to ECU 25,000 for each day of delay computed
from the day set by the decision, thereby compelling them to supply complete
and correct information requested by a Commission decision20 8 or to submit to
an investigation ordered by Commission decision.20 9
IV. Conclusion
Concentrations falling within the scope of the Merger Control Regulation are
evaluated in terms of their compatibility with the Common Market. 210 The
Merger Control Regulation provides several criteria for such appraisal that have
not been clarified by Commission notices, as have other aspects of the regulation,
and thus leaves a wide margin for the interpretation of these criteria to the
discretion of the Commission. Concentrations creating or strengthening domi-
nant positions, significantly impeding effective competition in the Common Mar-
ket, or in a substantial part of it, are always incompatible with the Common
Market.211 On the other hand, mergers that do not create or strengthen a dom-
inant position because of their limited market share must be declared compatible
with the Common Market. 21 2 In this respect it is interesting to note that one of
the nonbinding interpretive provisions preceding the Regulation 213 states that
concentrations whose limited market share does not exceed 25 percent either in
the Common Market or in a substantial part of it may be presumed to be
compatible with the Common Market. In making its determination as to com-
patibility, the Commission takes into account the following criteria: market struc-
ture, real and potential competition from within and beyond 214 the Community,
207. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 8(6).
208. Id. art. 15(1)(a).
209. Id. art. 15(1)(b).
210. Id. art. 2(1).
211. Id. art. 2(3). This provision is vague, in that it fails to clearly define what is meant by "a
substantial part" of the Common Market. It is conceivable for example that a single German "land"
could be deemed as such while one of the smaller of the Member States might not. Recently, it was
reported that a controversy exists within the Commission as to whether a dominant position within
the Dutch coffee market, acquired by Douwe Egberts N.V., constitutes a dominant position within
a substantial part of the Common Market. Commission Dispute over Benelux Coffee Merger, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) T 662 (1990).
212. Merger Control Regulation, art. 2(2).
213. Id. preamble 19.
214. Note that the implementing regulations of the EC's Competition provisions do not consider
elements beyond the Community. See Regulation No. 17, supra note 27.
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market position of the concerned parties, barriers to entry, consumer interests,
and economic/technical progress. 21 5 The time limits imposed on the Commission
to process a notification will obviously demand great effort on its part to respect
them.
Deals that fail to constitute a merger as defined by the Merger Control Reg-
ulation and interpreted by the Commission, fall within the concurrent jurisdiction
of both EC and Member State review. Conversely, deals that do constitute a
"concentration" under the Regulation, but fail to have a Community dimension,
are left to the sole supervision of Member State authorities and are excluded from
the application of EC competition rules, 2 16 unless a Member State authority
expressly requests Commission intervention for a matter that does affect intra-
Community trade. 217 As discussed above, these transactions will not benefit
from the redeeming features of the Merger Control Regulation since they will
remain subject to provisions whose application are not subject to strict time
limits. Some may even wonder if the increased pressure put on the Commission
by the Merger Control Regulation's strict time limits will cause the pace of its
other procedures to slow down.
The Commission's Directorate General on Competition has been reorganizing
and adding to its staff with a view toward preparing for this new instrument of
EC competition policy. Clearly, it offers a higher degree of legal certainty for
both companies within and beyond the EC that contemplate large-scale acquisi-
tions, mergers, and joint ventures. It will also, if followed, accelerate the reg-
ulatory process surrounding large corporate restructurings. The notification re-
quirements alone are demanding, as failure to adhere strictly will most likely
result in delays or even fines. Ironically, the complicated nature of the notifica-
tion form and the corresponding exceptions granted the Commission as to the
time limits in the event of delay or incomplete filings may operate ultimately to
undermine one of the Merger Control Regulation's purposes, that being the
quickening of the Merger Control process. It remains to be seen, however, how
the Commission, the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice will balance
the interest of enforcement against that of expediting commercial transactions.
It might appear that the documentary production requirements of the Merger
Control Regulation could operate in a repressive manner with respect to those
215. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2(2).
216. Id. art. 22(2). This provision states that Regulation No. 17 "shall not apply" to concen-
trations as defined in article 3 of the Merger Control Regulation. Id.
217. Note that the Regulation provides for other derogations from the principle of one-stop merger
control, e.g., Merger Control Regulation. For example, Member States may request that mergers be
referred back to national competition authorities even when Community dimension exists when such
a concentration threatens to significantly impede effective competition "on a market within the
Member States which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market." Id. art. 9. Member States
may also take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests, other than those taken into
consideration by the Commission and as such may allow Member States to block a merger cleared
by the Commission based on the grounds of public security, plurality of media ownership, or
prudential rules for financial institutions. Id. art. 21.
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companies whose activities it was intended to facilitate. Another possibility is
that the Commission itself is not prepared to handle the vast amounts of docu-
mentary analysis and tracking that the new Regulation promises to generate.
However, European companies are much less prolific than their American coun-
terparts in the generation and filing of internal corporate files. While it is also
true that they are generally more reluctant to part with what few documents they
do possess, it is possible that intra-European transactions might not create the
bureaucratic confusion that many commentators foresee. In addition, one could
also defend the Commission's position in this regard by simply considering that
the demanding information requirements of the Regulation will, if met, save
concerned parties much time because the Commission, as a general rule, ulti-
mately pursues information until it acquires it. In simple terms, if the Commis-
sion is not in possession of the required information at the outset of an investi-
gation, it will prolong such an investigation until it acquires it.
The mandatory notification requirement, while providing more certainty to
parties, will also operate to deny them the option existing under Regulation
No. 17 of not notifying certain agreements, thereby maintaining absolute con-
fidentiality and avoiding the drawing of the Commission's attention to deals
hovering in the grey areas of competition law. Obviously, the vast amount of
sensitive information required for notification, which clearly exceeds that re-
quired under preexisting procedures, would have created an incentive for "non-
notification" had this option been opened. The improvements of legal certainty
as to the status of particular deals may also be questioned due to the wide array
of transactions that may fall within the definition of a merger.
Concerns have been expressed over what may have been perceived as insuf-
ficient safeguards as to the confidentiality of the information disclosed during the
process. 21 8 Article 17 of the Merger Control Regulation provides for the confi-
dentiality of the said information. Nevertheless, business circles fear too many
opportunities for sensitive information to be divulged. Such information will be
available not only to Commission officials, but also to outside persons, such as
Member States' authorities to which a merger can be referred under certain
circumstances 2 19 or who may be involved in investigations, 220 as well as those
sitting on the special Committee who must be consulted before the Commission
makes major decisions. 22' Likewise, although it is specified that the Commission
must take into account the interest of the parties that their business secrets not be
divulged when it publishes a notification, which it is required to do when it
engages into a merger's assessment,222 the very fact of such a notification may
218. See, e.g., Reasoner, supra note 87.
219. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 9.
220. Id. arts. 12, 13.
221. Id. art. 19(3).
222. Id. art. 4(3).
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under certain circumstances be inappropriate from a business viewpoint. Hear-
ings, on the other hand, will not be public, and the Commission has committed
to take the parties' interest for confidentiality into account when ruling on the
presence of persons summoned at hearings.223
These comments aside, the EC's new Merger Control Regulation has been
anxiously awaited and promises to offer parties a procedure for expediting large-
scale transactions that were previously governed by ill-suited and awkward pro-
visions. As such, it offers to parties more security and perhaps an incentive for
further economic growth in the emerging integration of Europe.
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